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> CHAPTER 8
RETURN TO HOMELAND - RELOCATION
IV. Return or Minority Return
It is only just over two years since Dayton was signed. In a country so divided ethnically by the
war, in a country where there was so much physical destruction of personal and productive capacity,
not to count infrastructure, preparing the conditions for return takes time. But if the focus and most of
the energy are concentrated on return to areas in which the returnee will be a minority, the return
process will take another ten to fifteen years at the rate of return demonstrated by mid-1998. Given the
pressures from European countries with large numbers of refugees who have received temporary
asylum, fifteen years is too long a time - far too long a time. 
Should a program of reintegration into Bosnian society be developed to complement the
minority returns program to the specific homes, villages and towns from which the refugees and
displaced persons fled? As the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (March 1998) noted,
“Successfully reintegrating them [the refugees and displaced persons] into Bosnian society is essential
both from a humanitarian perspective, and to ensure sustained economic growth and overall political
stability in the medium-term.” (p. i) Clearly, returns to minority areas requires a much greater degree of
commitment from the Bosnian authorities at the local level than they have demonstrated thus far. It also
requires a far higher degree of political intervention and a more activist IPTF and SFOR presence to
guarantee security by the international community. 
In the meanwhile, other aspects of Dayton are largely being ignored - particularly the right of
the displaced persons and refugees to receive compensation and get on with their lives. We will have to
examine whether initiating a compensation program will undermine the minority returns program, but we
must first note what the experienced internationals in BiH have concluded will be necessary in order for
the minority program to have much greater success.
The March RRTF plan calls on the international community for intensified OHR intervention,
enhanced SFOR and IPTF preventive actions, increased support for UNHCR human rights monitors,
and increased financial investment for jobs and education as well as infrastructure and housing. In
addition, the local authorities are reprimanded for not putting a stop to double occupancy, for
continuing to allow bureaucratic obstructions to slow the rate of return, for not removing remaining
legislative barriers for obtaining permits, etc, and for in general lacking the requisite will to carry out the
provisions of the Dayton Accords.
But the international community has been so focused on the reintegration provisions of Dayton
that it has all but ignored the provisions for compensation and the rights of the displaced and refugees to
get on with their lives even if it means resettlement and reintegration in majority areas or abroad. Article
7 is routinely and repeatedly cited to support the vast array of measures required to support minority
return, while those provisions for alternative initiatives are ignored. Is the international community just as
responsible for ignoring these provisions of Dayton as the indigenous authorities are for undercutting the
minority return provisions? Would the pressure be eased and the prospects for minority returns
enhanced if a proper compensation program were developed? Or would the development of such a
program undermine the minority returns program rather than enhance it?
On a bus stop touring through BiH, I met a young man who worked as a manager in a small
airline company. He spontaneously translated my needs to the local restauranteur. He had a wife who
spoe perfect English and a four year old daughter. Both he and his wife were of mixed Bosniac/Serb
extraction. As it turns out, he had recently obtained permission to migrate to Canada after only applying
four months ago and was going through the agony of deciding by the end of the year whether he would
follow through on this inititive and deal with the trauma of emigration and the agonies of leaving behind
family, particularly both sets of parents. But he was just one example of the despair that gripped many
younger people when economic prospects still looked so poor several years after the end of the war,
when the situation seemed to still be so unstable, and when Kosovo and the reminders of the lack of
international resolve to intervene as thugs took the initiative in determining the real results on the ground. 
He was but a small example of the continuing hemorrhaging of human capital of young and educated
people as the country struggled to get on its feet.
The RRTF report as well as many others have noted that the time of easy returns to areas
controlled by the majority and to which the returnee belonged is over. 1997 returns were 40% lower
than 1996, and 1998 looks like it will be lower still, well under the number targeted. As the RRTF
report noted, reiterating the theme of other studies, “Few people have returned to areas where they
would be ethnic minorities, and such ‘minority returns’ are often localized in the Zone of Separation 
and correspond to elderly individuals or large groups with strong international back up.” (pp. i-ii) 
It is often said that most displaced people and refugees express as their first desire a wish to
return to their homes from which they fled. But this is virtually a universal wish among refugees and
means nothing. It is not a basis for policy. For it is always conditioned by the qualification “if things
could get back to the way they were.” The desire is not unconditional. Nor does it exclude the
possibility of other choices. The question is whether the international community has done an adequate
job in offering those other choices as contemplated and provided for in the Dayton Accords. Further,
“a large number of rural people who were displaced into cities express little desire to return to their
villages.” (RRTF, 1998 ii) The war simply greatly accelerated the rural-urban migration process.
With the stress on minority return, the RRTF report concluded that, “The primary factor for
refugee and displaced persons when making the decision to return is political. A proper political and
environment and security are critical pre-conditions. To date, economic assistance has proven to have
little influence on the decision to return if political conditions are not right.” (ii) Fair enough as stated, for
economic assistance has been focused on returns to minority areas. Why not facilitate the process of
return by providing economic assistance that would facilitate return to majority areas and decrease the
demand external political and security interventions, which, in any case, could never be any where near
sufficient gven the size of the country. 
In majority areas, the political and security concerns significantly diminish, though they
certainly do not go away. The focus can then be on accommodation and employment opportunities, the
latter enhanced when private investors are not faced with continuing ethnic tensions and insecurity. The
RRTF report noted that, “Assistance should be aimed at ensuring refugees and displaced persons can
make free and informed choices with regard to their place of residence within Bosnia and
Herzegovina.” (ii) But for free and informed choices to be made, a market must be available for them to
sell and buy their property and relocate to areas with security and employment opportunities, which in
turn enhances the attraction of some areas for private sector investment and for more migration to that
area. Instead, the RRTF report sees free choice of migration to majority areas as the exception and the
alternative option. “In appropriate cases, assistance may, however, also be directed towards those rural
populations who wish to settle permanently in cities, and to persons returning to majority areas from
asylum countries.” In other words, in recognition of rural to urban migration, and under the compulsion
to resettle refugees from abroad, assistance could be provided to returns to majority areas. This was in
clear recognition that the policy of rebuilding houses in small villages that had been evacuated and in
which the houses had been destroyed in order to attract returnees to minority areas had not been
successful. “Reconstructing villages of origin has proven both costly and relatively ineffective in
motivating such people to return; even once their homes are repaired, they ted to stay in town.” (RRTF
Task Force, March 1998, 33)
Perhaps one should be grateful for small gifts. But why not create an environment which shifts
the burden from assistance to a market in real estate and which allows choices to be made instead of
basing policy almost entirely on a political doctrine which stresses economic assistance priorities for
minority areas. Because the minority relocation program would then be undermined? Perhaps that is
both the motive for ignoring the compensation issue and reduced support for minority integration might
even be a consequence. But, as I will suggest, a properly devised compensation program based on
market considerations would not only enhance the number of returnees, but ease the impossible
pressures and demands on the current efforts towards minority return. After all, as it now exists, even if
with enhanced aid as advocated and indicated as required by the EC and World Banl (April 1998),
“External financial support will remain insufficient compared to the needs.” (RRTF, iii)
The present program, in light of the World Bank’s post-Washington doctrine of framing
economic reforms within a political/security context, now puts the emphasis on the political/security
environment and places economic revival and employment creation, housing and infrastructure
reconstruction within that context. However, all those efforts are put within the larger political ideology
of minority integration to ensure that the “ethnic cleansers” do not enjoy what Emil Fackenhem called
(in reference to the Holocaust) a posthumous victory. Perhaps, one of the motivations for putting a
provision for property compensation within the Dayton Accords was to satisfy a demand of the Serbs,
but which the other side, supported by the international community, had no intention of implementing.
However, if those reluctant to implement Dayton, and hell-bent on undermining the intentions of the
peace agreement, see some provisions ignored, then how can they be faulted for ignoring others. 
There is another argument for making use of the compensation provisions in addition to relieving
the pressures for a proper and adequate implementation of the minority return provisions, the
humanitarian interest in allowing the refugees and displaced persons to get along with their lives, the
principle of allowing those individuals to make the key choices rather than having those choices
predetermined by extremist spoilers or internationals committed ideologically to exclusive emphasis on
minority return, and for keeping the principle that all provisions and not just selected provisions of the
Dayton Accords should be upheld and implemented. It is the principle of humanitarian realism - that is,
ideals must be implemented taking account of reality lest that very reality totally subvert idealist goals.
Therefore, the stress should be placed on as free and full an individual choice as is possible to
enhance the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, and to do so to enhance the
options both for relocation in majority areas as well as reintegration in minority ones. The RRTF March
1998 report emphasized that, “To achieve harmonious reintegration in accordance with Annex 7 of the
Dayton Peace Agreement, international assistance is needed - or population movements will result only
in chaos and long-lasting uncertainty for many.” I would argue that placing the whole emphasis on
harmonious reintegration means that there will never be sufficient international support, that the
possibilities for harmonious reintegration will be undermined, that progress will be slow and
discouraging and that the results will ensure that there will certainly be ‘long-lasting uncertainty for
many’. What is needed is to put the other track in place provided in Dayton, to create a capital rather
than assistance package which will facilitate a sale of properties for those unwilling or unable to return
to minority areas.
V. Changing Direction: From Minority Return to Relocation
While 1998 had been declared the year of minority returns, a number of changes
indicated a significant shift in strategy for the international community. The shift began with the
recognition that the policy of minority returns would enjoy, at best, only a very minor success. If
something was not done, the refugees and internally displaced would be left in limbo for years. Further,
as little as the success was of minority returns, it was also set back by the continuing destruction of
property and the exodus of minority populations from majority areas following the signing of the
Dayton Accords. It began with the continuation of the ethnic cleansing after the cease-fire; 60,000 Serb
nationals from Sarajevo moved in February and March of 1996 as the biggest single movement, but
there were other lesser movements as well.
As indicated in the beginning of this article, the Dayton Accords had made provision for an
alternative strategy to minority returns - namely compensation. “A Refugees and Displaced Persons
Property Fund (the “Fund”) shall be established in the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be
administered by the Commission. The Fund shall be replenished through the purchase, sale, lease and
mortgage of real property which is subject to claims before the Commission. It may also be replenished
by direct payment from the Parties, or from contributions by States or international non-governmental
organizations.” 
Though the shift in strategy was probably stimulated by the recognition by astute and
experienced officials in the international community that the minorities strategy would enjoy only limited
success, the recognition of the need to develop an alternative strategy came when the views of
displaced persons were ascertained. The beginning of implementing this provision for creating a
mechanism for relocation began with two separate surveys, one done by the Danish Refugee Council in
November of 1997 and another undertaken jointly by the UNHCR and the Commission in December
of 1997. Heretofore, the received reasoning was simple - displaced persons and refugees simply
wanted to return to their original homes. These surveys changed that perception even though many of
the questions were intended to reinforce the minority returns strategy.1
First, both surveys clearly and unequivocally made clear that a majority of Serbs (53%) did not
even want to return to their original homes at all and a further 22% were equivocal even if the majority
of their neighbors returned and even if local authorities guaranteed their safety. Though a majority of
Croats wanted to return and, overwhelmingly (80%) Bosniacs chose this option, this question only
indicated a first preference, not what they would or would prefer to do given the current circumstances.
For example, in a separate survey of Croats from Bugojno and of Bosniacs from Prozor done for the
CRPC, the desire to return was also accompanied by a desire to shift an area from one that would give
them only a minority status into an area in which they would be a majority. In other word, the
preference for return was conjoined with a preference for collective return and the reconstitution of that
area as a majority area for the individuals group. Further, the survey indicated that it was the older
people who wanted to return to their original homes while younger people, especially those from small
villages and rural areas, just wanted to get on with their lives in a place where they could be secure
(93% of those surveyed in the CRPC poll noted that trust of local authorities and the security they
provided was a prime consideration in the determination of where to live), and, more significantly,
access to employment opportunities. Interesting enough, an overwhelming 97% of the displaced
persons and refugees indicated that the quality of the housing was more important than even
employment opportunities. None of these preferences were inconsistent with the readiness of the
majority to live side by side members of other ethnic groups. They just did not want to do so at the
expense of their own sense of security.
What emerged most clearly from the surveys was that the prime issue for most of the displaced
was not return to origins, but the political environment and security, and, for younger people,
employment opportunities. Of course, the availability of accommodation was also a key consideration.
Minority registrations in elections would be one indirect indicator of a desire to return. But in
the western part of Republika Srpska, only 14% of eligible voters registered. The greatest reluctance to
receive minority returns has been in contested areas, areas that in the pre-war period had one group in
the majority and in the post-war period had another group in control. In other words, “minority returns
may be easier to achieve in areas where an overwhelming pre-war majority still exists” and, more
notably for the RRTF Task Force was the recognition of the complementary proposition: “Minority
returns will be more difficult, at least for some years to come in municipalities and regions where current
majorities were minorities or narrow majorities prior to the war.” (p. 9) 
The strategy of minority returns now had to deal with contested areas. The phase of easy
returns to majority areas and minority areas was now over. The heart of the problem now had to be
confronted. Would the strategy cocnetrate on an idealistic effort to restore the situation of a mixed
population before the war, or would the effort now be placed on accepting the new reality, however
much it played into the hands of the ethnic cleansers and however distasteful it was to facilitate the
accomplishment of their goals, even if it was for humanitarian purposes and the best interests of the
displaced population. Clearly, the time had come to offer a new strategy to complement the
overwhelming emphasis on minority returns.
The motivation of refugees and the very limited success of the minority returns policy were not
the only reasons. The acceptance of general trends in migration was another critical factor. One of the
key factors in migration in general is the existence of housing shortages which provide one pressure for
movement. So does the rural/urban shift. Beyond the security issue particular to areas of conflict, in
addition to lack of access to housing and the attractions of city life, a key factor in migration is the
existence of employment opportunities. Thus, focusing only on majority returns to majority areas and
returns to minority areas ignored population shifts as a dynamic process.
This was, of course, one of the key factors in migration factors in general for housing shortages
provide one pressure for movement. So does the rural/urban shift. But beyond the security issue
particular to areas of conflict, the key factor in migration is employment opportunities. Thus, focusing
only on majority returns to majority areas and returns to minority areas to reconstruct the status quo
ante tended to reify populations rather than accept that populations movement was a fact of life even in
non-conflict areas. The conflict not only forced the issue of relocation on an unwilling population, but
accelerated patterns and trends already present.
The RRTF Action Report recognized the existence of all these factors and its new action plan
began to prepare the ground for the shift in emphasis from minority return to relocation. In March, the
RRTF Action Plan had stressed a new path and priority: “donors should focus their financial assistance
on accompanying population flows, as well as supporting focused interventions aimed at promoting
return.” (p. 4) In other words, not only was it now acceptable to financially support relocation, this was
the preferred new strategy while efforts at minority returns continued.
Though UNHCR was an integral part of the new Action Plan, its public rhetoric was more
cautious when it came to implementation. While UNHCR restated the theme of voluntary return to pre-
conflict homes for refugees and displaced persons “as the preferred solution” as well as local integration
(into Croatia for Bosnian Croats there and into the Republic of Yugoslavia for Bosnian Serbs there)
and resettlement in third countries, a fourth option was opened in June of 1998 when UNHCR in a new
policy offered “relocation” as a fourth real option. It was now acceptable to rehouse refugees and the
internally displaced into majority areas - that is, to relocate the refugees and displaced persons. “On 9
June 1998, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council announced its support for the
Regional Return Strategy presented by UNHCR.” (Segal 1998, 1)
To implement the new direction in policy, a key mechanism had to be put in place to break the
gridlock imposed by the existing housing stock being occupied by people who were not the rightful
possessors of that property. A facility was needed so that rightful possession and existing occupancy
could be onece again brought into allignment. For as it existed, people occupied property in which they
did not have rights and had rights to property which they did not and, in most cases, could not occupy. 
The Property Options Strategy was developed to deal with the alternative to return for those
refugees and displaced persons no longer in possession of their property to offer an option for just
compensation in lieu of return. Essentially, the intention of the Fund was to set up a mechanism for a
market in certificates so that refugees and displaced persons who did not want to return or who had
decided they would not be able to return to sell their certificates at a just price under the circumstances.
It is also clear that the option of Compensation and the mechanism for its implementation serves the
direct interests of the ethnic cleansers.
The CRPC operates by collecting property claims and issuing certificates of entitlement. By
June 1998, the Commission had received 100,000 claims and, as of 1 July, 10,000 certificates had
been issued. (Siegel 1998, 5) The certificates enable the refugees and displaced persons not only to
return home, but to lease or sell their property or postpone any decision without prejudice to a later
date. The Property Options Strategy was developed to deal with the alternative to return for those
refugees and displaced persons no longer in possession of their property to offer an option for just
compensation in lieu of return. Essentially, the intention of the Fund was to set up a mechanism for a
market in certificates so that refugees and displaced persons who did not want to return or who had
decided they would not be able to return to sell their certificates at a just price under the circumstances.
It is also clear that the option of Compensation and the mechanism for its implementation serves the
direct interests of the ethnic cleansers.
On 9 June 1998, the mechanism for compensation emerged into the open and “The Steering
Committee welcomes the Property Options Strategy developed by the Commission for Real Property
Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC).” However, the new option was undermined as
soon as it was endorsed since the resources for the Property Compensation Fund was to be generated
locally by the two Entities. Thus, even though Dayton provided that contributions to the Fund could
come from international sources, the Steering Committee had excluded this option. In fact, the initial
draft proposal for the Compensation Fund had suggested that the Fund be created by redirecting
“major donor support for reconstruction activities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina” to the Fund
matched by contributions from the two Entities. This would clearly have undermined the monies used as
sticks for the minority return, and, in any case, was unnecessary if the fund was to be self sustaining. On
the other hand, in contrast to the UNHCR proposal, there was no reason that contributions to the Fund
could not come from capital, repayable loans from the international community rather than from
concessionary loans and grants. The Fund was explicitly intended to break the gridlock where a
displaced person in one area could neither purchase his existing state of residence nor receive
compensation or possession for his residence occupied by another displaced person.
What are the numbers involved. According to the RRTF Action Plan of March 1998, “refugee
returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina and further movements of displaced persons are likely to involve no
more than 400,000 people in the two to three years to come.” (p. 9) This means 100,000 households.
At an average cost of $20,000 rehabilitation cost per house and and a purchase price averaging
$20,000 for the distressed property and a contingency of $10,000 for other factors - demining, etc.,
we are talking about a capital investment of $50,000 x 100,000 homes for a total of US$5 billion.
These need not be concessionary grants. Further, only 60% or US$ 3 billion needs to be provided in
fact as 40% of the monies could come from the sale of property rights in the territory where the
individual originally came from.2
This partially explains the incentives behind the Open Cities Initiative (see below) but it does not explain
the neglect of provision for financing and facilitating returns to majority areas of those refugees who are
unwilling or unable to return to minority areas.
“Whereas the RRTF maintains that ‘relocation is not a solution t the refugee problem,’ [source, RRTF,
December 1997, 18] UNHCR considers that ‘relocation is an important component in the search for
durable solutions for displaced persons and refugees.’[source, UNHCR, December 1997, 5- Note: the
reference supported only voluntary and not passive or hostile relocations]
 (ICG May 1998, 7)
“The main proponents of relocation are Croat and Serb hard-liners: the HDZ, the SDS, the Serb
Radical Party (SRS, Srpska radikalna stranka), the SNS (Srpski narodni savez) party pf President
Biljana Plavsic, and the Serb Party for Krajina and Posavina (SSKIP).”  (ICG May 1998, 8)
“Relocation is clearly unacceptable when it takes place as a result of official manipulations and would
likely leave behind frustrated, hate-filled or despairing refugees. It would also play into the hands of
those forces who most want to destroy all potential for restoring a multi-ethnic Bosnia.”  (ICG May
1998, 7)
“Prime Minister Dodik in March 1998 urged first the exchange of property, then financial
compensation, and third, return with the respect of the personal will of refugees.”  (ICG May 1998, 8,
Oslobodjenje, 10 March 1998 cited)
“The combination of political resistance in many parts of Republika Srpska and a weak economic
foundation leaves one likely solution for the vast majority of returnees: relocation.”(ICG May 1998, 12)
“Zeljo Matic, chairman of the Association of Croats from Republika Srpska explains that the only
durable solution for the 230,000 Croats displaced from Republika Srpska is to build new viallages in
Croat-controlled Federation in the Neretva valley and the Stolac plateau.” (ICG My 1998, 8, the
citation is from Slobobodna Bosna, 27 Feb. 1998)
“The degree of relocation that has taken place in the Una-Sana Canton, especially in Sanski Most,
supported in large part by funds from West European countries that host refugees, has now rendered
the return of Serbs exceedingly difficult.” (ICG May 1998, 9)
“A (CRPC May 1998, 1)t the end of May 1998, CRPC had completed and distributed 7,400 decision
1. For an interpretation of these surveys, cf. RRTF Action Plan, March 1998, 5-6.
2. This estimate is close to that one arrived at by Bosnian authorities who stated “that bout US$8,000
to US$10,000 per person would be needed for successful return and reintegration, i.e. about US$3 to
US$4 billion for the expected 300,000 to 400,000 persons.” (RRTF Action Plan, 1998, 16)
certificates.” (CRPC May 1998, 3
“At current funding levels, the decision making rate of 3,200 per month is well below the needs of the
peace process.” (CRPC May 1998, 3)
